Divisional Circulation

HSE

Health & Safety Executive
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate

Incident Report no. **112/2009**

File reference **4.4.2.1662.**
2009/279713

Preliminary Report - Provisional Information

Nuclear Incidents - Fast Stream Report FAST 1

The following is a preliminary report of a nuclear incident and is without prejudice to the results of fur her investigation and study, It is provided for information ONLY at this stage and should not be used without further reference to NII.
Please transmit by hand at all stages. NOTE: REPORT TO BE TYPED OR COMPLETED IN BLACK INK AND BLOCK CAPITALS

1. Name of site: Hinkley Point B

Date of Incident: 16th July 2009 Time of incident: 13:30

Source of information: [redacted] Time and date information received: 14:30 17th July 2009

Part of plant involved: Reactor 3 gas bypass plant

/A

2. Nature of Incident:

Licensee INES rating: 1

REC22
REC 23
REC 50

Eight men were contaminated whilst replacing a valve and pipe spool on Reactor 3 gas bypass plant.

Is the incident likely to be of interest to the Department of Transport	Yes		No	X	Not known	
Was radioactivity released?	Yes	X	No		Not known	

If yes, give quantity and nature of release - Local release of contaminated dust into the gas bypass plant area. The floor contamination was 700cps by swab, with a peak of 900cps.

Were personnel affected?	Yes	X	No		Not known	

If Yes, How were they affected? - At least one man had 100cps by swab on the face and nose area. All eight men have been sent to Harwell for whole body dose measurements. Urine samples have also been taken. The first whole body dose result is available, indicating 1.5 microSv.

Is the incident notifiable under Licence Conditions or other statutory provisions?	Yes	X	No		Not known	
Does the incident meet HSE's publication criteria?	Yes		No	X	Not known	

	1	2a	2b	3	4a	4b	5
If Yes - which criterion?							

Is the Press likely to have an interest ?	Yes		No	X

Is the Licensee reporting the incident under the Ministerial Reporting	Yes		No	X	Not known	
Is the licensee issuing a press release?	Yes		No	X	Not known	

3. Initial Estimate of Safety Implication

Is the safety significance thought likely to be:

	Major?		Minor?		Not known	X
affecting only the reported site?	Yes	X	No		Not known	
be applicable to other sites?	Yes		No		Not known	X
have major significance:						
a) in the short term?	Yes		No		Not known	X
b) in the long term?	Yes		No		Not known	X

Any other comments

The SRD duty officer has provided the following additional information:

Reactor 3 was depressurised and in air. The work party was required to change ball valve BG1761 and an associated pipe spool. In order to enable the work to be done, a negative local air pressure in the circuit was created by setting gas circulator IGV positions and a pressure control valve. The work went ahead under these conditions. The CCR was informed once the ball valve had been replaced. The work party then continued to fit the spool piece. During this phase, the air pressure in the circuit became positive, presumably following a change in reactor conditions initiated by the CCR. Ball valve BG1761 was indicated closed, but was in fact open. The puff of positive air pressure carried contaminated dust out of the circuit and onto the work party.

The above is an initial BE SRD view which will be confirmed by a company investigation that has been initiated (SACI).

4. Action taken by NII

Fast stream raised in response to SERs call from SRD Duty Officer.

Incident discussed with Hinkley Point B

The ND site inspector will follow-up during the next site visit.

5. Any Other Comments

None.

Report made by [redacted]

N*ame (in BLOCKS)* [redacted] Date 22nd June 2009