- Site: Hartlepool
- IR number: 21-117
- Date: November 2021
- LC numbers: 28
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
This intervention record covers a planned inspection performed as part of an Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Operating Facilities Division (OFD) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s (EDF NGL) Hartlepool (HRA) nuclear power station reactor 1 (R1) 2021 statutory outage (R113).
The main purpose of this inspection was to inspect a sample of control and instrumentation (C&I) related statutory outage activities in order to confirm they had been correctly carried out and that C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety will remain fit for their intended purpose until the next statutory outage.
Intervention Carried Out by ONR
The inspection covered by this intervention report was undertaken in support of ONR’s 2021/22 statutory outage inspection programme.
This intervention involved a sample inspection of the HRA R1 2021 statutory outage (R113) C&I related LC 28 (examination, inspection, maintenance and test (EIMT)) activities associated with the following equipment and systems:
- Reactor safety circuits (RSCs):
- Guardlines.
- Neutron flux detectors (NFDs).
- Control rod control system (CRCS).
- Reactor post trip logic system (RPTLS).
- Data processing and control system (DPCS).
- In-core (IC) and hot box dome (HBD) thermocouples.
- Gas circulator control system (GCCS).
- Chloride ingress protection system (CIPS).
This intervention also involved a sample review of notable C&I related incidents and operating experience (OPEX) relevant to HRA that has arisen during the last three years.
The findings of this inspection will contribute to ONR’s regulatory decision to grant Consent to the return of R1 to normal operating service in accordance with LC 30 – periodic shutdown.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Not applicable.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
During this inspection we found that the C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety EIMT related activities referenced within the outage intentions document (OID) for the HRA R1 2021 statutory outage (R113), which we sampled, appeared, on the whole, to have been satisfactorily completed or were on schedule to be completed. It should be noted that in relation to the latter we were confident, based on the information provided, that the outstanding EIMT activities would be completed satisfactorily.
We did identify a small number of maintenance record keeping shortfalls and raised them with the relevant system engineers (SEs), who agreed to addressed them. It should be noted that we did not consider that these shortfalls posed an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety or needed to be addressed before R1 returns to service.
During the inspection we held discussions with several C&I equipment and system stakeholders and found that they had a good understanding of the systems and equipment they were responsible for and that they appreciated the importance of the statutory outage work being undertaken. We also noted examples of proactive equipment performance trending, and considered the safety circuits hot spare arrangements and the safety circuits and DPCS equipment test facilities to be good examples of equipment sustainment relevant good practice (RGP).
During the plant walkdown, we found the standard of housekeeping was, on the whole, acceptable. However, we did find several items of foreign materials exclusion (FME) inside a number of cubicles located within the R1 safety equipment room and noted a number of failed light tubes along the route of the plant walkdown. We therefore raised two regulatory issues (RIs) to capture these issues and will monitor their progress through to resolution as part of normal regulatory business. It should be noted that we did not consider that these issues posed an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety or needed to be addressed before R1 returns to service.
We did not identify any significant signs of age related degradation with respect to the items of C&I equipment that we inspected. However, we did note that the cases of a small number of post office type relays, which were located in the R1 equipment room, were mottled inside. We therefore raised a RI to capture this issue and will also monitor its progress through to resolution as part of normal regulatory business. It should also be noted that we did not consider that this issue posed an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety or needed to be addressed before R1 returns to service.
We also noted that the ambient temperature within the equipment rooms that we visited was appropriate.
Based on our sample inspection of the C&I aspects of the HRA R1 2021 statutory outage (R113) we have assigned an intervention rating of Green to LC 28 compliance.
Conclusion of Intervention
From the evidence gathered during this inspection of a sample of HRA R1 2021 statutory outage (R113) activities, we did not identify any C&I issues that would pose an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety or prevent ONR issuing a Consent to allow R1 to restart. Therefore, from a C&I perspective, we recommend that support be given for a Consent to allow R1 to return to normal operating service. This is subject to the satisfactory completion of the planned EIMT activities and any emergent work.