



Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Site Report for Winfrith

Report for period 1 January – 30 June 2021

Foreword

This report is issued as part of ONR's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. Reports are distributed quarterly to members for the Winfrith Site Stakeholder Group and are also available on the ONR website (<http://www.onr.org.uk/lrc/>).

Site inspectors from ONR usually attend Winfrith Site Stakeholder Group meetings and will respond to any questions raised there. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact ONR.

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1 INSPECTIONS

1.1 Dates of inspection

During quarters one and two of 2021, inspections by the ONR inspectors were made on:

- 28 April / 6 May 2021 – Magnox Limited Winfrith Site
- 2 June 2021 – Magnox Limited Winfrith Site

Remote interactions with site provided assurance that the site continued to maintain its safety, emergency and security arrangements.

2 ROUTINE MATTERS

2.1 Inspections

Inspections are undertaken as part of the process for monitoring compliance with:

- the conditions attached by ONR to the nuclear site licence granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) (as amended);
- the Energy Act 2013;
- the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA74); and
- regulations made under HSWA74, for example the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17) and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR99).

The inspections entail monitoring the licensees' actions on the sites in relation to incidents, operations, maintenance, projects, modifications, safety case changes and any other matters that may affect safety. The licensees are required to make and implement adequate arrangements under the conditions attached to the licence in order to ensure legal compliance. Inspections seek to judge both the adequacy of these arrangements and their implementation.

The inspections at the Magnox Ltd Winfrith site focused on the following Licence Conditions (LC) and safety regulations:

- LC14 Safety Documentation
- LC15 Periodic Review
- LC35 Decommissioning
- Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005

ONR generally judged the site arrangements in response to safety requirements to be adequate in the areas inspected. Where improvements were considered necessary, the licensee made satisfactory commitments to address the issues. The site inspector will monitor progress during future visits and where necessary, ONR will take formal regulatory enforcement action to ensure that appropriate remedial measures are implemented to reasonably practicable timescales.

2.2 Other work

Throughout this reporting period, including the period of national lockdown, ONR's nominated site safety inspector has held regular telephone meetings with the ML Winfrith and Tradebe Inutec Ltd leadership team representatives to maintain situational awareness of matters related to nuclear safety. No significant issues were highlighted to ONR.

ONR continues to monitor the implementation of COVID-19 risk management arrangements on both the Magnox Ltd and Inutec Ltd sites. It was the opinion of the site inspector that these were in accordance with government guidance.

ONR has conducted preparatory assessment and site visits to support its considerations on a forthcoming permissioning decision regarding the civil construction works at the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR) on the ML site. The construction works support future reactor core segmentation (decommissioning) and containment structures.

3 NON-ROUTINE MATTERS

Licensees are required to have arrangements to respond to non-routine matters and events. ONR inspectors judge the adequacy of the licensee's response, including actions taken to implement any necessary improvements.

There was one safety related incident notified to ONR during the period:

On the 22 March 2021 at the Dragon facility on the ML Winfrith site, during a planned operation to lift a Purge Gas Pre Cooler (PGPC) and place into a shielded box for subsequent size reduction, a quantity of radioactive aqueous liquid was spilt during handling operations. The activity of the liquid spilt exceed the quantities specified in the Ionising Radiation Regulations for reporting. No significant external or internal exposure to the operators occurred and there was no exposure to members of the public. There was no spread of contamination outside of the Dragon facility. ONR undertook preliminary enquiries and determined that the dutyholder had taken appropriate immediate mitigation measures and that formal ONR investigation was not required. ONR currently awaits completion of the dutyholder's investigation prior to determining the nature of any enforcement action.

There were two transport related incidents notified to ONR during the period:

On the 14 January 2021 and 4 February 2021, Tradebe Inutec Ltd notified ONR of two separate transport-related events whereby transport documentation did not fully align with the transport package contents. Due to the close proximity of the two events and their similar nature, the dutyholder and ONR have considered the response in unison. In both cases the discrepant items were appropriately packaged and did not affect the categorisation of the shipping container. There was no consequence to the site's operators, environment or the public. ONR is content with the dutyholder's response to the incident and continues to monitor implementation of improvement actions to its material accountancy systems. ONR's enforcement activity relating to these incidents is detailed in the next section.

4 REGULATORY ACTIVITY

ONR may issue formal documents to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Under nuclear site licence conditions, ONR issues regulatory documents which either permit an activity or require some form of action to be taken. These are called 'Licence Instruments' (LI) but can take other forms. In addition, inspectors may issue Enforcement Notices to secure improvements to safety.

No LIs or Enforcement Notices were issued during the period.

Regulatory advice has been provided to Tradebe Inutec Ltd in response to two transport-related events where transport documentation did not fully align with the transport package contents. ONR set out its regulatory expectations to the dutyholder so that all measures necessary were taken to ensure future consignments were legally compliant with the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009. ONR expects the findings from the licensee's investigation to be implemented in full, and in a timely manner.

Reports detailing the above regulatory decisions can be found on the ONR website at <http://www.onr.org.uk/pars/>.

5 NEWS FROM ONR

Covid-19 (Coronavirus) (ONR position)

We are continuing to obtain assurance that nuclear site licensees and other dutyholders are adequately resourced to continue to safely and securely carry out their activities. We remain satisfied with industry's response at this time and there has been no significant change to dutyholders' safety and security resilience.

All licensed sites are required to determine minimum staffing levels necessary to ensure safe and secure operations and contingency arrangements in the event that these levels are not met. This condition is specifically designed to ensure that industry can adequately manage and control activities that could impact on nuclear safety and security under all foreseeable circumstances, including pandemics.

Although ONR staff continue to work primarily at home, (carrying out as much of our work as possible via videoconference, phone and email), we are carefully and progressively increasing our site footprint. We continue to assess our on-site presence in line with government guidelines and our business needs, ensuring we have a balanced portfolio of on-site inspections and interventions, that are important to support effective regulation across our purposes.

Our latest position can be found on our [website](#).

Enforcement Action

- In January 2021, we agreed to extend two [Improvement Notices](#) served on the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), recognising the good progress made so far. The Notices, which were served in June 2019, relate to the way the company controls changes to organisational structure and resources which may affect safety.

- In January 2021, we served an [Improvement Notice](#) on Sellafield Ltd following a number of electrical safety incidents across the site. While we are satisfied that Sellafield Ltd is currently meeting the high standards expected with regards to nuclear safety, as a regulator we require sustained improvements in the area of electrical safety.
- In February 2021, we served an [Improvement Notice](#) on Morgan Sindall Construction and Infrastructure Ltd after workers came close to striking a live high voltage electric cable during excavation work at the Sellafield site. Nobody was harmed in the incident on 7 October 2020, and there was no impact on the public or the environment. However, the incident posed a serious risk to workers who were operating within one metre of the 11kV cable.
- In April, we announced that EDF [complied](#) with a Direction we served on 14 December 2020, under the Pressure Systems Safety Regulations (2000). This followed an inspection, at which found a number of pressure system components at Heysham 1 Power Station were overdue their scheduled examination.
- In May, we agreed to [extend an improvement notice](#) served on EDF in September 2020, recognising the progress made so far. The notice was served after some of the equipment used to measure reactor power at Heysham 2 was incorrectly configured. We judged that Heysham 2 is able to operate safely, and that additional time to demonstrate the required improvements will not pose a risk to safety. EDF must now comply with the improvement notice by 31 July 2021.
- In June, we announced that Rolls-Royce Submarines Ltd (RRSL) had [complied](#) with an improvement notice served on 29 May 2020. The notice was served after RRSL operators brought 21 units of fissile material into the facility – which exceeding the limit defined within the safety case and set out in the Criticality Control Certificate for the facility.

Changes to ONR leadership structure

- In February 2021, we provided an update about the leadership structural changes we initially announced in December 2020. Under existing contractual arrangements, current Chief Executive Adrienne Kelbie CBE was always expected to step down as her extended term of office comes to an end in January 2022. Current Chief Nuclear Inspector Mark Foy will step into the new combined role on 1 June 2021, when the new leadership structure will come into full effect.
- In February 2021, we announced that we had appointed Donald Urquhart to the newly-created role of Executive Director of Operations, which will form part of our new leadership structure. As Executive Director of Operations, Donald will be responsible for leading our regulatory work.
- In March 2021, we announced that as part of our new leadership arrangements, we had appointed three new deputy chief nuclear inspectors (DCIs) to our regulatory and senior leadership teams: Jane Bowie, Paul Dicks and Steve Vinton, currently all senior superintending inspectors at ONR. All three new

DCIs have a strong track record of delivering regulation across the organisation, and will help us maintain a focus on our Strategy 2020-25

Stakeholder Engagement

- In February 2021, we encouraged interested parties to take part in a Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) survey about building and maintaining trust between nuclear safety regulators and the stakeholders they engage with.
- In April, we published an [article](#) introducing our newest board member, Jean Llewellyn, who joined us in October 2020, as security lead. Jean brings with her a wealth of experience, including serving as a non-executive director on the board of the World Institute for Nuclear Security since 2018 – which has given her a good understating of the global security challenges facing the nuclear industry.
- In May, we issued our e-bulletin '[ONR News](#)' to subscribers. This issue included farewell reflections from our outgoing chief executive, a leadership update, further information on our COVID -19 response, and the results of our latest stakeholder survey. You can sign up for our e-bulletin [here](#)
- On 1 June, we [announced](#) the full implementation of our new leadership structure. Mark Foy is now our combined Chief Executive and Chief Nuclear Inspector. He is supported by Sarah High as Deputy Chief Executive, and Donald Urquhart as Executive Director of Operations.
- In June, we published our new [Corporate Plan for 2021/22](#), which sets out our key priorities to protect the public by securing safe nuclear operations.
- In June, our State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) project - which saw ONR become the UK's national nuclear safeguards regulator from 31 December 2020, was [shortlisted for a national award](#) in the Project Management Institute's UK National Project Awards in the 'Project of the Year (Public Sector)' category.
Nuclear safeguards are measures to verify that countries comply with international obligations not to use nuclear materials from civil nuclear programmes for non-peaceful purposes.

All our latest news is available on our website www.onr.org.uk

6 CONTACTS

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