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Nuclear materials imported to the UK from Russia

Date released
26 August 2022
Request number

202207016

Release of information under
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA)

Information requested

I would like a list of all nuclear materials imported to the UK from Russia from 1 January 2010.

For each shipment I would like the following information:

  • What was imported
  • Quantity / volume of what was imported
  • Shipment date
  • Name of supplier
  • Name of receiver
  • The value of what was imported

Please can you send me the information in an Excel file.

Information released

We confirm that under s.1 of the FOIA, we hold some of the information in scope of your request, please see below for further details.

Part 1 - What was imported

The following material was imported from Russia to the UK for use within the civil nuclear industry (April 2010 - February 2022):

  • Radioactive material, uranium hexafluoride, fissile (UN2977)
  • Radioactive material, Type A package, special form non fissile or fissile-excepted (UN3332)

Parts 2 - 5

The quantity/volume of what was imported, shipment date, name of supplier and name of receiver, is all classed as Sensitive Nuclear Information (SNI). For which we are refusing to release under s.24 of the FOIA.

SNI has a number of legal definitions within UK legislation, within The Anti-Terrorism,

Crime and Security Act 2001,The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR) 2003, and The Energy Act (TEA) 2013. Whilst not taking precedent over these legal definitions, a simple, working definition of SNI can be described as information relating to activities carried out on or in relation to civil nuclear premises; and deemed to be of value to an adversary planning a hostile act. This definition and further guidance can be found within ONR’s Classification Policy.

S.24(1) applies where withholding the information requested is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security. It works to protect national security, which includes protection of potential targets. It allows a public authority not to disclose information if it considers releasing the information would make the UK or its citizens more vulnerable to a national security threat.

We have made a careful and thorough assessment of your request and consider that the information falls within this category and as such is required to be exempt from disclosure for the purposes of safeguarding national security. As this is a qualified exemption, we are required to balance the public interest between disclosure and non-disclosure. We have therefore applied the Public Interest Test, as set out below:

Part 6 - The value of what was imported

I confirm that under s.1 of the FOIA, we do not hold this information.

Further information

For further information about the import and transport of radioactive material and our role within this, please see the following links:

Exemptions applied

s.24

PIT (Public Interest Test) if applicable

S.24 FOIA – Safeguarding National Security

Factors for disclosure

  • ONR is committed to being an open and transparent regulator. We will use openness and transparency to achieve our objective of developing and maintaining stakeholder trust in ONR as an effective independent regulator.
  • Issues related to the nuclear industry are subject to close scrutiny and debate, there is a public interest in information related to the import of radioactive materials into the UK and the release of such information.
  • The information may provide reassurance to the public about the safety of transporting radioactive material.

Factors against disclosure

  • Under s.24(1) of the FOIA, the exemption applies where withholding the information is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security, and the use of the exemption for the information in scope is deemed reasonably necessary. Releasing detailed information about the quantities of radioactive material along with exact details of when and where the movement of radioactive material has taken place, would make the UK and its citizens more vulnerable to a national security threat and a potential radiological emergency.
  • If released, this specific information could assist an adversary or hostile actor (which includes state actors, as well as individual terrorists or terrorist groups) to develop intelligence about the movement of nuclear material that may help them for planning potential criminal activity at some future date.
  • Adversaries or hostile actors can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather separate pieces of intelligence to attempt to expose vulnerabilities.
  • We note that for s.24(1), the ICO guidance makes it clear that safeguarding national security includes protecting potential targets even if there is no evidence of an imminent attack. The guidance states: “The Commissioner also recognises terrorists can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather intelligence. This means there may be grounds for withholding what seems harmless information on the basis that it may assist terrorists when pieced together with other information they may obtain”.
  • The nature of the risk regarding the theft or sabotage of nuclear material adds weight to the public interest for non-disclosure. The consequences from a radiological event are so great that even if there was only a low risk that disclosing the information would aid such an attack, there is a very strong public interest in withholding this information. 

Conclusion

After careful consideration of the factors set out above, we have concluded that the information should be withheld. On balance, the interests of safeguarding national security, far outweigh the need for openness in terms of the specific information that you have requested.