- Site:AWE Aldermaston
- IR number: 19-110
- Date: November 2019
- LC numbers: 17
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
This intervention, conducted at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston licensed site, was undertaken as part of the ONR AWE 2019/20 intervention plan and weapons sub-division strategy.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
During the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s (ONR) November 2019 site inspection week, I conducted a planned Licence Condition (LC) 17 (“Management Arrangements”) compliance inspection of the licensee’s arrangements for the project management function, including their adequate implementation.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
On 12th November 2019, I, the site inspector for the Uranium Technology Centre (UTC), accompanied by two ONR project inspectors and an inspector from ONR Regulatory oversight undertook a planned LC17 Licence Condition inspection of AWE’s Project Management System arrangements for two specific projects. The projects were the Material Handling Store (MHS) and the ‘A’ site Periodic Review of Safety (PRS) and Safety Case. A representative for the AWE internal regulator also participated in the inspection.
The MHS aspects of the inspection were primarily focussed on changes to AWE management systems and how those changes are introduced and embedded throughout the project management function. Key areas to inspect within projects were identified as the revision of the project management arrangements in line with the Association of Project Managers (APM) Body of Knowledge (BoK) and the AWE organisational change which brought together Programme Management Office and Project Delivery functions.
For the ‘A’ site PRS/Safety Case submission the context of this inspection was primarily to sample the adequacy of AWE’s management arrangements to produce a PRS. The inspection focused mainly around the ‘A’ site Safety Case Project Execution Plan and the ‘A’ site PRS Specification and references associated with these two documents.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
This was not a systems inspection.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
The key findings from the inspection were:
- AWE identified that the transition to the project management arrangements to align with the APM Body of Knowledge is still work in progress. The Inspection team requested the date when it is expected that the new arrangements would be fully in place and implemented such that a follow up intervention by ONR could be carried out. AWE took an action to provide this information.
- AWE provided assurance that all decisions made which may impact Nuclear Safety are made through appropriate Suitably Qualified and Experienced Persons (SQEP) personnel. However, AWE, were unable to provide evidence of which decisions could be made by the project manager and which decisions would require consideration of a Nuclear Safety SQEP person. The MHS Project Manager stated that, where there was any doubt over a Nuclear Safety aspect of a project, a relevant process would be followed to ensure a SQEP person would be consulted. The inspection team noted that this would require future regulatory engagement to better understand how AWE assure themselves that a SQEP assessment against Nuclear Safety is carried out where appropriate.
- Given the significant delay in the submission of the ‘A’ site PRS, the arrangements do not appear to have been adequately implemented. AWE plans to undertake a Review Learn Improvement (RLI) workshop to better understand the reasons for the late delivery of a fit for purpose ‘A’ site PRS submission. Once the RLI is complete, ONR will conduct a follow up intervention with the PRS team to discuss the findings from the RLI, and also to gain visibility of how AWE intend to implement the RLI findings into their extant management arrangements.
Conclusion of Intervention
Overall, from the evidence sampled during this inspection, I judge that there was sufficient evidence that the licensee’s formal arrangements for compliance with LC17 are being implemented adequately for the areas sampled for the MHS project management function, but are inadequate for the ‘A’ site PRS submission. Because of the significant (approximately one year) delay in the ‘A’ site submission, the inspection is rated overall as inadequate (Amber). Future regulatory engagement is required to review the key findings above. These follow up Level 4 interventions will be conducted as part of normal regulatory business during future site visits.
A Regulatory Issue for AWE to demonstrate the implementation of the findings of their RLI workshop into their existing management arrangements will be raised as a result of this inspection.