- Site: Winfrith
- IR number: 19-148
- Date: December 2019
- LC numbers: 7, 17
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
This inspection was undertaken as part of a planned programme of inspections for 2019/20 at the Magnox Ltd (ML) Winfrith site.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
During this inspection I examines a sample of the arrangements made under licence conditions 7 (incidents on the site) and 17 (management systems)
I sought to gain evidence that:
- The Licensee has an active reporting culture, recording and investigating and trending events and identifying and implementing corrective actions to help prevent recurrence i.e. an effective Operational Experience Feedback (OEF) process.
- Staff and managers actively pursue and address organisational learning opportunities from all relevant sources.
I met with the Winfrith Safety Representatives to discuss any issues they wished to raise.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Not applicable.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
I found that the licensee was able to demonstrate compliance through its arrangements made under LC 7 and LC 17.
The management arrangements to comply with LC17 were inspected using LC7 related matters as an example. This was in response to LC17 shortfalls identified during recent LC32, 33 & 34 inspections. I was provided with evidence of the overarching management system arrangements through a Harwell/Winfrith specific Compliance Statement and inspected the requirements of each paragraph related to LC7. In my opinion the arrangements inspected were adequate to ensure safety but compliance issues still result from not fully incorporating the old RSRL management system into the new ML corporate arrangements.
The management arrangements for LC7 compliance were inspected taking into account previous inspections on this theme. OEF is collated in a corporate database, however it does not provide any trending data for establishing lower safety significance events to prevent reoccurrences. ML personnel were aware of this issue and were keen to report to the corporate centre the feedback from my inspection. The Safety and Quality Manager also briefed me on the issue of providing feedback to staff raising issues to close the OEF loop. Steps had been taken to improve this, however the actions had not adequately addressed the issue and further actions would now be undertaken.
From interviews with the Industrial Safety Engineers from the SGHWR and Dragon Decommissioning Projects relating to the implementation of the LC7 arrangements for incorporating OEF into work conducted at the projects, it is my opinion that this is adequate for nuclear safety and more strategic level planning but consideration should be given as to whether improvements in the arrangements for incorporating OEF into routine “setting to work” could be improved. When I asked the Industrial Safety Engineers who is responsible for their profession as a safety engineer, I was informed they work for the project at Winfrith but are managed within a Magnox Corporate “project” profession and have no management link to a safety profession. Consideration should be given by the Licensee as to how a management link between the safety profession, but not limited to this profession, and all safety professionals can be establish to ensure good practices and OEF are shared.
I met with the ML Winfrith Safety Representatives to discuss the Southern Sites’ issue regarding awareness of the roles and responsivities of the safety representatives.
Conclusion of Intervention
In my opinion the Licensee's arrangements for compliance with LC 7 and 17 are adequate from the sample of arrangements inspected and the staff interviewed during the inspection. I therefore concluded that there are no matters that may impact significantly on nuclear safety.