- Site: Hartlepool
- IR number: 20-040
- Date: August 2020
- LC numbers: 26
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
The purpose of this planned intervention was to undertake compliance inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s (NGL) Hartlepool power station. The intervention was undertaken in line with ONR’s inspection programme contained in the Hartlepool Integrated Intervention Strategy for 2020/21.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
In my capacity of nominated site inspector for Hartlepool Power Station I performed an inspection against Licence Condition (LC) 26 – ‘Control and Supervision of Operations’. I was accompanied by the incoming site inspector for Hartlepool, with whom I conducted a site‑based handover. The incoming site inspector also held introductory meetings with a number of the site’s senior staff.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Not applicable; no system based inspections were undertaken during this intervention.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
The start-of-shift briefs and pre-job briefs are effective tools and are used well at Hartlepool. The station recognises that these must be delivered by competent persons to be effective. Minor issues were found with work order card and permits; further reinforcing the need for effective prejob briefs as these errors are often caught by the working party at this stage. Possible improvements could be made in the production of those documents.
When used, the ‘Time Out for Personal Safety’ process is an excellent way of capturing potential impacts to the working party, but should include consideration of the working parties impact on others as well as fire-fighting equipment and exit locations.
Standards and expectations set for both the NGL staff and contract partners are clear and regularly reinforced by managers and team leaders. Post job debriefs should be utilised more often to help promulgate learning from success, as well as learning from failure.
The station has identified and addressed a potential breach of the Pressure System Safety Regulations 2000, notifying ONR appropriately. Any ONR enforcement action will be determined by formal application of the Enforcement Management Model, in line with ONRs arrangements.
The station is developing a plan for addressing seasonal readiness to enable it to move to a proactive management approach. However, further detail is needed before ONR can form a view of the adequacy of the plan.
I consider the measures installed for coronavirus mitigation to be appropriate and staff are adhering to social distancing guidelines where possible.
Conclusion of Intervention
Based on the sample inspected and the evidence obtained, I rate the inspection as ‘GREEN – no formal action’ for LC26 ‘Control and Supervision of Operations’, in line with established ONR guidance:
- “Relevant good practice generally met, or minor shortfalls identified, when compared with appropriate benchmarks”,
- “No significant shortfalls identified in the delivery of safety or security functions.”
- “Relatively minor, if any, deficiencies in compliance arrangements.”
Items for potential improvement were fed back to the station. No regulatory issues were raised.
There are no findings from this intervention that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. At present, no additional regulatory action is required over and above the planned interventions at Hartlepool Power Station.