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Licence Condition 17 Management systems compliance inspection (Supply Chain and Quality)

  • Site: Hartlepool
  • IR number: 20-019
  • Date: August 2020
  • LC numbers: 17

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This was a planned compliance inspection of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd.’s (NGL’s) Hartlepool Power Station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Operating Facilities Division (OFD) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The work was carried out in accordance with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hartlepool Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2020/21 and as part of the 2020/21 intervention plan operating reactors Supply Chain and Quality Assurance (QA) strategy (CM9 Ref: 2019/360564).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I conducted a planned Licence Condition (LC) 17 (“Management Systems”) compliance inspection in relation to Hartlepool’s supply chain management and Quality arrangements.

The purpose of LC17 is to ensure the licensee has established and implemented management systems which give due priority to safety and within its management systems, make and implement adequate quality management arrangements in respect of all matters which may affect safety.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

This was not a system-based inspection

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

This LC17 inspection examined the QA, supply chain (including goods receipt) and lifetime records arrangements. A number of low-level shortfalls in the arrangements were found.

Overall, however, from the evidence sampled, I judged that the licensee adequately demonstrated compliance with the requirements of LC17 and therefore rated this inspection as Green, no formal action.  I note that there are a number of low-level QA shortfalls, which the station has started to address. A Level 3 Regulatory Issue 8066 has been raised at fleet level which, when completed will address the QA shortfalls found.

Conclusion of Intervention

There were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.  At present, no additional regulatory action is needed over and above the planned interventions at Hartlepool Power Station as set out in the Integrated Intervention Strategy, which will continue as planned.