- Site: Dounreay
- IR number: 21-009
- Date: April 2021
- LC numbers: 10, 23, 24, 27, 28, 34
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
The purpose of this inspection was to undertake a systems-based inspection at Dounreay Site Restoration Limited (DSRL) in accordance with the 2021/22 Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for Dounreay to confirm that the licensee is controlling its hazards and complying with its statutory obligations.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
The Systems-Based Inspection (SBI) was focused on the Irradiated Fuel Caves within the PFR Facility. The SBI examined the adequacy of the safety case and its implementation against the requirements of the following licence conditions (LC):
- LC10 – Training.
- LC23 - Operating rules.
- LC24 - Operating instructions.
- LC27 - Safety mechanisms, devices, and circuits.
- LC28 - Examination, inspection, maintenance, and testing.
- LC34 - Leakage and escape of radioactive material.
The intervention also provided the opportunity to conduct a remote inspection against the following:
- Review of progress against Regulatory Issues and Agreed Regulatory Actions.
- Review of DSRL’s Internal Regulation capability.
- Meeting with the Site Safety Representatives.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
We consider that safety systems we examined to support operations within the Irradiated Fuel Caves to be adequate against the requirements of the above licence conditions.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
DSRL continues to make good progress in addressing regulatory matters raised from previous inspections. Outstanding issues are being actively progressed with oversight from DSRL’s internal regulation capability.
The SBI conducted at the Irradiated Fuel Caves (IFC) within the PFR facility examined the staff’s understanding of the key outcomes from the safety assessment of the activities conducted within the IFC. We then examined how the limits and conditions identified within the safety assessment had been captured and reflected in the associated operating instructions and the maintenance of safety related plant and equipment. This inspection included a plant visit to the IFC, where we took the opportunity to assess the understanding operators had regarding the hazards and associated limits and conditions associated with the activities being undertaken at that time. We also examined the training undertaken by operations staff including the Project Supervisors, and we examined how the arrangements addressed potential leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste.
Overall we were satisfied that the limits and conditions and safety related plant and equipment identified within the safety assessment had been adequately captured within the associated operational and maintenance documentation reviewed; that the training records examined reflect the level of understanding expected of staff; and that the arrangements provide an adequate demonstration against the requirements regarding the control of leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste.
Conclusion of Intervention
Overall, we consider that the safety justification supporting the activities undertaken within the IFC has been implemented adequately against the requirements of those licence conditions covered by the SBI. We did not identify any matter impacting on nuclear safety that required any further immediate regulatory action.