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Unannounced compliance inspection of LC26, Control and supervision of operations

  • Site: Sellafield
  • IR number: 21-033
  • Date: June 2021
  • LC numbers: 26

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) undertakes all regulatory interactions with the Sellafield site licensee (Sellafield Limited, (SL)) against a strategy defined by the ONR Sellafield, Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste (SDFW) Division. This was a planned unannounced Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspection undertaken in accordance with that strategy.

This unannounced licence condition inspection was carried out to determine the adequacy of NNL’s implementation of the SL corporate arrangements for compliance with licence condition (LC) 26 – Control and supervision of operations, at the Active Handling Facility (AHF) at Sellafield.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I, the NNL Site Inspector, carried out a planned unannounced licence condition compliance inspection against LC26, Control and supervision of operations on 8 June 2021; I was supported by the Remediation Site Inspector throughout the inspection. The inspection comprised:

  • observation of the Plant Operations Control Centre (POCC) meeting;
  • interviewing the DAPs, task supervisors and operators;
  • witnessing three operations including one with contractors;
  • sampling Suitably Qualified Experienced Personnel (SQEP) training and assessment package;
  • sampling minimum safety manning level roles and training requirements.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

N/A as this was not a safety systems inspection.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I consider the POCC provided a good overview of the plant conditions that might affect operational safety. The healthy challenge from the team and the open-minded attitude of the management exhibited good nuclear safety culture at AHF. Through discussions with the DAPs, task supervisors and operators, and by witnessing three tasks with different focuses, i.e. one routine operation, one with significant nuclear safety risks and one by contractors, I consider that work in AHF was authorised, briefed, undertaken to written procedures, controlled and supervised in compliance with the SL corporate arrangements for LC26, for both NNL employees and contractors.  

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence sampled during the inspection, we judge that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that AHF’s implementation of the SL corporate arrangements in compliance with LC26 was adequate; therefore, an inspection rating of Green (no formal action) was merited. The rationale for this decision was discussed with the licensee and the decision was accepted.