- Site: Heysham 2
- IR number: 21-100
- Date: October 2021
- LC numbers: 10, 11
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
The purpose of this intervention was to observe the training for emergency preparedness by observing a shift exercise at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s (NGL) Heysham 2 power station.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
In my capacity of nominated site inspector for Heysham 2 Power Station, I observed the shift exercise, “Nova” with two other inspectors. This was done because the last demonstration exercise was a simulated desktop based exercise, not involving a forward control point (FCP), and so an existing issue related to communications between the access control point (ACP) and the FCP could not be judged, observed or closed. This was the first full scale training exercise in over 18 months (due to Covid-19 restrictions), as it was not a demonstration the external emergency services did not take part and it was not rated by us.
The exercise was stood down by lunchtime but the station took the opportunity to consider potential ongoing, longer term actions in the afternoon by continuing the scenario as a desktop discussion between the command centres. This was observed by us.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
No system based inspection was undertaken hence, this is not applicable for this intervention.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
The exercise was challenging as it was a joint Heysham 1 and 2 exercise, that contained beyond design basis elements. This tested and exercised the use of off-site emergency equipment and the use of emergency response guidelines (SBERGs). Overall, there was a strong nuclear safety focus and control centres performed adequately considering that this was the first full scale training exercise in over 18 months. However, the station was unable to close the issue relating to communications between ACP and the FCP.
In the afternoon a desktop discussion between the command centres was, in my opinion, beneficial and allowed a number of additional learning points to be drawn out from the exercise.
Conclusion of Intervention
I attended the station feedback session the following day and station had captured all of the learning points that our team had noted. Overall I considered it to be a challenging scenario that enabled the station to gain a number of valuable insights that should improve the station’s emergency preparedness going forward. The issue relating to communications between ACP and the FCP will remain open and should be closed on or before the next demonstration exercise in January 2022.