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Planned System Based Inspection of flask movement systems for Magnox East River, Fuel Handling Plant

  • Site: Sellafield
  • IR number: 21-097
  • Date: October 2021
  • LC numbers: 10, 23, 24, 27, 28, 34

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

In accordance with the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s (ONR’s) Sellafield Strategy, each year ONR performs a series of planned System Based Inspections (SBIs) targeted on key safety significant systems. The purpose of this particular inspection was for ONR to determine the adequacy of implementation of Sellafield Ltd’s safety case claims for the flask movement systems for Magnox East River (MER). In particular, it focussed on the protection against drop loads and compliance with the Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998. 

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

On the 5th to 7th October 2021, I carried out a planned three day inspection of the MER flask movement systems utilising specialists from the following technical disciplines:

  • Internal Hazards
  • Conventional Health and Safety

In order to determine the adequacy of the licensee’s implementation of the safety case   claims in respect of these systems, I examined evidence to verify the adequacy of the implementation of Sellafield Ltd’s arrangements for six pre-defined licence conditions (LCs), as listed below:

  • LC 10 – Training (NS-INSP-GD-010)
  • LC 23 – Operating Rules (NS-INSP-GD-023)
  • LC 24 – Operating Instructions (NS-INSP-GD-024)
  • LC 27 – Safety Mechanisms, Devices and Circuits (NS-INSP-GD-027)
  • LC 28 – Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing (NS-INSP-GD-028)
  • LC 34 – Leakage and Escape of Radioactive Material and Radioactive Waste (NS-INSP-GD-034)

The inspection involved reviewing the applicable claims in the safety cases and sampling evidence to determine compliance against the selected LCs on the plant. This was achieved through a combination of document reviews, plant inspections and discussions with operators and maintenance staff.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Based upon the areas sampled I judge that the safety case requirements for the MER flask movement systems have been adequately implemented.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

For LC 10, I targeted the training of a Duly Authorised Person (DAP), Lifting Operations Appointed Person (LOAP), crane driver and assistant team leader (acting as banksmen) associated with operational activities of the 45 tonne and 60 tonne crane systems. Overall, I judged that the required standard was met and an inspection rating of Green (no formal action) is appropriate against LC10.

For LC 23 and LC24, I was satisfied that the safety case clearly identified the fault sequences and that the instructions followed a detailed step wise format containing the relevant steps to meet the safety case requirements. Based on the evidence sampled I judge that an inspection rating of Green (no formal action required) is merited against Licence Conditions 23 and 24.

For LC27 and LC28, I undertook a review of the maintenance records and system health reports. From the evidence sampled, I was satisfied that the relevant safety mechanisms were correctly identified in the safety case and from the plant visit were seen to be in adequate condition. I therefore judge that the required standard was met and an inspection rating of Green (no formal action) is appropriate against LC27. Based on the maintenance records and the system health reports sampled, I was satisfied that the condition of the flask movement systems (45 Tonne and 60 Tonne cranes) was known, and appropriate measures were in place to refurbish and repair any known problems.  I therefore judge that the required standard is met and an inspection rating of Green (no formal action) is appropriate against LC28.

For LC 34, I reviewed the potential for leakage and escape of radioactive material in connection with MER flask movement systems. From the information sampled in the inspection, I was satisfied that the appropriate measures were in place to prevent and manage the leakage and escape of radioactive material in connection with the flasks. I therefore judge that the required standard is met and an inspection rating of Green (no formal action) is appropriate against LC 34.

During the inspection, no significant shortfalls were identified, however, there were some minor opportunities for improvement identified by the inspection team and verbal advice was provided for each of these.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence sampled during the inspection, I judge that Sellafield Ltd has adequately implemented the relevant claims in the safety case and that the formal arrangements for LCs 10, 23, 24, 27, 28 and 34 are being adequately implemented. For LCs 10, 23, 24, 27, 28 and 34 an inspection rating of Green (no formal action) is merited.