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Conventional Health and Safety Risk Prioritisation at AWE A*Technology Centre (ATC)

  • Site: AWE
  • IR number: 21-171
  • Date: November 2021
  • LC numbers: N/A

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

In accordance with the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Strategy, each year ONR performs a series of planned interventions at nuclear licensed sites. This intervention forms part of ONR’s 2021/2022 Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE).

AWE is currently subject to Enhanced Regulatory Attention from ONR. One of the three safety performance attributes that determines regulatory attention is ‘Control of Hazards and Risks’, part of which is the ‘Maturity of Conventional Health and Safety (CHS) prioritisation and risk profiling. The ONR Nuclear Internal Hazards and Site Safety Team is conducting an intervention to assess the adequacy of AWE’s approach to CHS Risk Prioritisation with much work already completed to understand how this works across the company. The purpose of this intervention was for ONR to examine how CHS risks are prioritised and managed at a local level, within the ATC Facility

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This intervention consisted of two stages. Firstly, a remote meeting a few days before the intervention with the ATC Principal Environment, Safety and Health (ESH) Managers and the local ESH team to understand risk priorities at ATC and the evidence used to establish these, and secondly, a 1 day site-based inspection consisting of meetings with relevant ATC site staff to understand what risk control measures are put in place for the priority risks, as well as a site walk-down to observe risk control measures at the work face.

I prepared an inspection scope and agenda and shared this with AWE prior to the intervention. During the intervention, I strictly adhered with control measures outlined within ONR-GEN-GD-022 (Visit to licensee and other duty-holder premises and other relevant locations during the COVID-19 pandemic) and the local COVID-secure control measures at AWE. It was established at the remote meeting that the risk priority areas for ATC are risk assessment, lifting equipment, confined spaces, emergency arrangements and dangerous substances/explosive atmospheres. These were the areas of focus for the site inspection.

Regulatory advice and judgement were based on determining compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the relevant statutory provisions made under the Act, particularly the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, as well as the following provisions:

  • Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998
  • Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002
  • Dangerous Substance and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002
  • Confined Spaces Regulations 1997
  • Work at Height Regulations 2005
  • Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I identified the following areas of good practice:

  • I judge that AWE and ATC have focussed their efforts in the correct areas and in balance, most of these priority risks have received requisite attention and control measures.
  • I spoke to several work parties and managers on the site walk-down in the facility and, in the main, they were all able to identify the key risks involved in their work and clearly articulate the ways in which these risks are controlled.

I also provided regulatory advice for several minor issues found on the walkdown of the ATC facility:

  • There were several areas where scaffolds and mobile scaffolds (including one in 8** which had an incorrect handrail configuration) that had scaffold tags that showed that the safety inspection date had passed. Workers were not using these scaffolds at the time of inspection, however the tags should be removed in these circumstances to indicate that the scaffolds are not in use.
  • There was an old lifting sling that had passed its inspection date left on a surface in a corridor near F**. These slings should be removed from site to prevent their use.
  • We spoke to the workers conducting engraving work and viewed the risk assessment for this work. There was some confusion about what type of Respiratory Protection Equipment (RPE) should be worn for this task and it seemed that the risk assessment had changed without the full understanding of the workers.
  • AWE agreed to take action on these minor issues and report actions taken via email by 29 April 2022.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence I sampled during this intervention, in the main, I was satisfied with how AWE decides on which CHS risks to give priority to and to understand how these risks are managed and controlled in ATC. As a result, I this intervention merited a ‘Green’ (No Formal Action) rating.