- Site: Hartlepool
- IR number: 21-120
- Date: November 2021
- LC numbers: 28
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
The primary purpose of this intervention was to establish whether EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (EDF NGL):
Has undertaken appropriate activities to assess, understand and address recent Hartlepool (HRA) nuclear power station gas turbine (GT) reliability issues.
Has / will implement adequate arrangements to ensure compliance with HRA GT safety case claims.
Intervention Carried Out by ONR
This intervention was undertaken by the ONR HRA Nominated Site Inspector and an ONR control and instrumentation (C&I) specialist nuclear safety inspector.
The intervention involved holding discussions with relevant engineering department stakeholders, reviewing a sample of safety case and examination, inspection, maintenance, and testing (EIMT) related documents, and undertaking a plant walkdown of the GT house.
The primary purpose aspects of this intervention were undertaken in relation to Licence Condition (LC) 28 – EIMT, which is an applicable provision of the Energy Act 2013.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
During the week of the intervention, the ONR HRA Nominated Site Inspector also undertook follow‑up enquiries in regard to a number of regulatory issues (RIs) and ONR notifiable events.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Not applicable.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
During the intervention we held discussions with engineering department personnel who had ownership responsibilities for the GTs and found that they had a good understanding of the GT system’s architecture, boundaries, operation, and safety case requirements.
Based on the information supplied to us, we considered that HRA has adequate GT maintenance arrangements and that HRA has sufficiently understood the various GT start reliability issues that have arisen and has / is adequately addressing them. Furthermore, we did not identify any common links between the various start reliability issues and also considered that HRA’s GT health monitoring arrangements were, on the whole, adequate. We were also content that adequate recovery and health sustainment activities have / are being undertaken by HRA.
During the plant walkdown, we found the standard of housekeeping inside the GT house was, on the whole, adequate. However, we did identify a small number of issues and asked for them to be addressed / reviewed. It should be noted that we did not consider that these issues posed an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety and that we will monitor their resolution as part of normal regulatory business.
We also noted that the lighting levels and the ambient temperature within the GT house were appropriate.
Overall, we considered that HRA has implemented adequate arrangements to achieve compliance with GT safety case claims and have therefore assigned an intervention rating of Green to LC 28 compliance.
Conclusion of Intervention
Based on the evidence gathered during this inspection we considered that HRA has undertaken appropriate activities to assess, understand and address recent GT reliability issues and has implemented adequate arrangements to achieve compliance with GT safety case claims.