- Site: Hartlepool
- IR number: 21-153
- Date: February 2022
- LC numbers: 10, 23, 24, 27, 28
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
The purpose of this intervention was to conduct a system-based inspection (SBI) of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd.’s (NGL) Hartlepool (HRA) Power Station, specifically on the emergency generation, and short break supplies systems, no break systems, transformers, grid and main electrical systems that support the function of the emergency boiler feed pumps (EBFP). This was undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the operating facilities division of Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
The intervention documented in sections 1 and 2 was carried out by an ONR electrical specialist inspector with support from a nuclear associate. For the purposes of this report, the term “we” refers to the judgements and opinions formed by the electrical specialist inspector, and nuclear associate during this intervention. The intervention documented in section 3 was carried out by the HRA nominated site inspector.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
The ONR electrical specialist inspector and nuclear associate performed a safety case informed SBI of the emergency generation, and short break supplies systems, no break systems, transformers, grid and main electrical systems to judge the systems’ performance against their safety functions. A function of these systems is to provide the infrastructure for electricity supply to HRA’s EBFPs in the event of an electrical supply interruption or a grid derived disturbance. At HRA there are redundant and diverse electricity supplies to the EBFPs for these purposes. The redundant and diverse electricity supplies are achieved through (i) the transformers, grid and main electrical systems and (ii) in the event of an electrical supply interruption or a grid derived disturbance system through the emergency generation, short break supplies and no break systems. Through examination of these systems, compliance inspections were performed against the following Licence Conditions (LC) which are provisions of the Energy Act 2013:
- LC 10 (Training);
- LC23 (Operating rules);
- LC24 (Operating instructions);
- LC27 (Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits);
- LC28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance, and testing); and
- LC34 (Leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste).
This inspection was based on sampling the implementation of the licensee’s arrangements provided by EDF Energy NGL against the LCs. The objective of the inspection was to determine whether the licensee’s arrangements were adequately implemented and in accordance with the systems’ safety case requirements.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
From this inspection, we judged that the implementation of the arrangements for the combined electrical systems that support the function of the EBFPs met the requirements of the safety case and were adequate.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
We consider that EDF Energy NGL demonstrated that they have arrangements to ensure the essential electrical systems that support the function of the electrically driven EBFPs are inspected, maintained and operated in accordance with the safety case. The arrangements examined complied with the licensee's legal duties on the areas sampled during the inspection.
The inspection of the essential electrical systems that support the function of the electrically driven EBFPs, inspected for LCs 10, 23, 24, 27, and 28, is rated as green on the basis that relevant good practice was met and no deficiencies in compliance arrangements were identified. No inspection rating has been assigned to LC 34 as it was not deemed applicable to this inspection.
Conclusion of Intervention
From the evidence sampled during this inspection against LCs 10, 23, 24, 27, and 28, we consider that EDF Energy NGL's implementation of their arrangements for the essential electrical systems that support the function of the EBFPs met the requirements of the safety case.
There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. At present, no additional regulatory action is needed over and above the planned interventions at HRA power station as set out in the integrated intervention strategy.