- Site: Torness
- IR number: 21-164
- Date: March 2022
- LC numbers: 11
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
The purposes of this week of interventions at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL) Torness power station were to:
- Observe a ‘Level 1’ emergency exercise ‘Gilbert’ the purpose of which was to demonstrate that arrangements for emergency response, required by Licence Condition (LC) 11 are adequately implemented
- Attend and participate in EDF NGL Torness’s Annual Review of Environment, Safety and Security (ARoS)
The interventions were planned as part of ONR’s inspection strategy for operating reactors and the inspection plan for Torness.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
I carried out this intervention in my capacity as nominated site inspector for Torness Power Station. The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
I observed the Level 1 emergency exercise ‘Gilbert’ with a team of ONR inspectors including the Head of Operating Reactors, two security inspectors for the station, and two other safety inspectors.
The ARoS is an event where station management meet safety, security and environmental regulators (ONR and SEPA) to present a self-critical analysis of the performance of the site over the past twelve months and the priorities for further improvement. This included a walk-down of the plant, a series of presentations and an opportunity for the regulators to respond.
I also held routine meetings with a number of key staff at the power station to exchange information.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
Exercise Gilbert was a joint safety and security exercise and was designed to test the response of site to an incursion which included a full site lock down, response and interactions between site safety and security incident managers and sites response to missing persons, two of which were casualties. As is normal, the shift team taking part was unaware in advance of the details of the exercise scenario.
I judged that the scenario was suitably testing, I observed significant improvement from previous demonstrations regarding casualty handling and extraction and the implementation of the site security lock down.
However, there were shortfalls in station meeting a number of their objectives set out for this Level 1 emergency exercise which included,
- Confusion over the responsibility for decision making.
- The emergency control centre not setting out clear incident focuses and associated actions to remedy the key focuses.
- The emergency control centre’s lack of and timely consideration for nuclear safety in identifying key plant and equipment’s vulnerability.
- The emergency control centre delayed evacuating personnel within exclusion zones.
ONR have requested that station provide a plan of action to address the above shortfalls and ONR will also observe an internal shift exercise to ensure the improvements have been adequately implemented.
I found that the Torness ARoS analysis presentation during the meeting was balanced and fair.
Conclusion of Intervention
Station’s own feedback self-identified most of the key findings following the level 1 exercise demonstration and these were also discussed with the station management team. There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. However, ONR have requested that station provide an action plan to remedy the shortfalls observed during the level 1 exercise. A level 3 regulatory issue will be raised to track any associated actions and the Torness site inspector will write to the station summarising ONR’s observation findings and any forward actions required.