Executive summary
- Inspection date(s): 2/11/2022
Purpose of inspection
The intention of this ONR inspection was to conduct a one-day themed Operational Standards Inspection (OSI) at the Berkeley Vault 3 (stage R4) decommissioning project relating to implementation of Limits and Conditions of operations in readiness for Magnox Ltd’s request to enter active commissioning of Vault 3 retrievals. This includes the control and supervision of operations which may challenge Limits and Conditions or the operation of physical safety measures. The inspection will rate Licence Conditions (LC) 10, 17, 26 and 36 for operational standards compliance at the Berkeley site.
Subject(s) of inspection
The following actives were the subject of this inspection:
- LC10 - Training
- LC17 - Management systems
- LC26 - Control and supervision of operations
- LC36 - Organisational capability
Key findings
I carried out a themed Operational Standards LC10, LC17, LC26 and LC36 inspection at the Magnox Ltd Berkely site. I reviewed the holistic implementation of the arrangements for these LCs and was able to establish the “golden thread” in the management system from the safety case to operational instructions to comply with the limits and conditions identified and to ensure sufficient operators were appropriately trained to understand their significance on plant. I established that an adequate safety case had been issued for Vault 3 retrievals which was generated from appropriate fault sequences, the creation of which complied with Magnox Ltd’s management arrangements. This included the generation of a “Safety Case Synopsis” to aid users in navigating the safety case documentation and a “Site Wide Safety Case Summary” which articulates the limits and conditions of operations for all activities on site, including Vault 3 retrievals.
I then attended the location of the work and was assured that operators fully understand the limits and conditions of operations by means of Plant Operating Instructions which give sufficient attention to operational steps which are necessary to keep the plant within the safe operating envelope identified in the Safety Case. I spoke to both Commissioning Leads and Duly Authorised Persons and was provided evidence that operator training was appropriate to the nature of the hazards operating the plant and that sufficient Suitably Qualified and Experience Persons (SQEP), would be required to commence Vault 3 retrievals.
I assessed the LC36 nuclear safety baseline and that LC10 compliant training would be given, maintained and monitored to ensure compliance with this baseline. I was provided evidence to ensure compliance with LC26 in appropriately controlling and supervising operations during Vault 3 retrievals.
Judgements made
It is my opinion from the safety case documentation assessed during this inspection that the LC17 management arrangements for the generation of such documentation is adequate and identifies appropriate limits and conditions for Vault 3 retrievals and these are documented in Plant Operating Instructions.
It was my opinion that an adequate and justified LC36 nuclear safety baseline was in place and that LC10 compliant training would be given, maintained and monitored to ensure compliance with this baseline. It is also my opinion that holistically this provides sufficient evidence to ensure compliance with LC26 in appropriately controlling and supervising operations during Vault 3 retrievals.
I therefore concluded that this inspection identified no further matters that may impact significantly on nuclear safety.