Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
- November 2023
Aim of inspection
To determine whether the control and supervision of operations at Fellside are suitable and sufficient to meet the nuclear safety requirements for steam provision originating from Sellafield Limited.
This is a planned inspection of the control and supervision of operations at Fellside Combined Heat & Power Plant (CHPP) + Boiler Park (FHB) with an emphasis on the provision of steam to the Sellafield Site. The scope of the inspection is informed by the loss of steam event (Dutyholder reference BN2301A2279) that occurred on the 21 January 2023.
Steam is an important utility in the support of operations and the Highly Active Liquor Evaporation and Storage (HALES) nuclear safety case makes claims on the availability of steam from CHPP. There is an extant Operating Rule (OR) that requires steam to be reinstated to HALES within 48 hours (which is currently under review). Therefore, Regulation 5 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR) also applies to the provision of steam as a preventive and/or protective measure.
Subject(s) of inspection
- LC26 – Control and supervision of operations – Rating: Green
- MHSWR – Rating: Green
Key findings, inspector’s opinions and reasons for judgement made
This was a planned inspection which considered compliance against Licence Condition 26 (LC26) Control and Supervision of Operations at Fellside Combined Heat & Power Plant (CHPP) + Boiler Park (FHB) with an emphasis on the provision of steam to the Sellafield Site. The scope of the inspection is informed by the loss of steam event (Dutyholder reference BN2301A2279) that occurred on 21 January 2023.
The aim of the inspection was to determine whether the control and supervision of operations at Fellside are suitable and sufficient to meet the nuclear safety requirements for steam provision originating from Sellafield Limited.
The primary focus of the inspection was control and supervision of Fellside such that Sellafield Limited and Px can react respond to incidents and events and restore steam supplies to the rest of the nuclear licensed site.
The inspection was undertaken against the following standards:
• LC26 Control and supervision of operations, NS-INSP-GD-026, Revision 6
• Regulation 5 of Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999
In my opinion, relevant good practice was generally met for Licence Condition 26 and the requirements of Regulation 5 of Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999.
A number of observations were made during the inspection which were primarily related to the internal investigation on BN2301A2279 on topics such as casual analysis and assurance and oversight of associated corrective actions as well as recognised examples of good practice including using coloured tags to indicate the status of valves.
Conclusion
The primary focus of the inspection was on the control and supervision of Fellside such that Sellafield Limited and Px can react respond to incidents and events and restore steam supplies to the rest of the nuclear licensed site. I was satisfied that appropriate corrective actions have been implemented in response to the steam loss event in January 2023.
The control and supervision arrangements of Sellafield Limited and Px Limited regarding steam provision from Fellside are frequent with a clear logic in terms of content and timing. In my opinion, the control and supervision arrangements between Sellafield Limited and Px Limited are in accordance with good practice.