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Nuclear Fuel Production Plant Raynesway - Inspection ID: 52917

Executive summary

Date(s) of inspection: March 2024

Aim of inspection

The RRSL site inspector highlighted concerns about the culture at the Contact Shop at RRSL. Specifically there have been several recent events suggesting significant deviation from expected behaviours, and a protected disclosure report highlighting some potential culture and leadership issues. These have identified potential behavioural and cultural shortfalls within the contact shop.

The aim of the inspection was to gain evidence of how the cultural factors affect safety performance, and determine the adequacy of the organisational response to address safety performance.

This was an unrated LMfS inspection but the executive summary will be published on the ONR website.

Subject(s) of inspection

  • Leadership & Management for Safety - Rating: Not rated

Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made

This report documents the findings from an inspection which sought to gain a common understanding of safety culture at the Contact Shop at RRSL. Over two days in March 2024 we carried out interviews and focus groups with a sample of the workforce. The aim of the inspection was to gain evidence of how the cultural factors affect safety performance, and determine the adequacy of the organisational response to address safety performance. We mapped the findings against nine cultural “warning flags” and developed insights into the culture at the site. This is an unrated inspection focused on Leadership and Management for safety.

During the intervention, we experienced positive and proactive engagement with the Contact Shop workforce, with open and honest discussions. It was acknowledged across those spoken to that the Contact Shop has been on an improvement journey over the last 5 years, where the profile of safety has increased, the visibility of senior leader team has increased, and more field leaders have been introduced. The effectiveness of this was seen culturally, where the interviewees reported being able to stop work on safety grounds, report accidents and events without fear of recrimination and have confidence that action would be taken, and are clear about the workforce expectations for behaviours. Additionally, all were clear about how to seek help or clarification from leaders. There was no evidence from anyone spoken to that production was prioritised over safety. However, the warning flags identified areas that RRSL could consider strengthening.

The key learning points are summarised as follows:

  • Maintain the initiatives and embed into normal business to support safe performance
  • Management of change – transition of leaders and loss of staff should be considered within the context of current arrangements to maintain behavioural standards;
  • Leadership – broaden to include DAPs to capitalise on their leadership role especially on nightshifts;
  • Reporting – clarify how events, enhancements and other changes should be reported, particularly as this is a mechanism to encourage involvement and engagement.

The Contact Shop has demonstrated that it has the capability to operate safely, and I judge that this provides a sound basis for future safe operations at the site, as new facilities are developed.

ONR encourages RRSL to consider the insights from this inspection within the Contact Shop and recognise the potential threats to its safety culture.

Conclusion

Overall, I judge that relevant good practice was met in the sample inspected with some areas of good practice and some areas that RRSL should consider strengthening.