Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection: December 2024
Aim of inspection
To evaluate Hartlepool's compliance with nuclear site licence condition (LCs) for Marking of the Site Boundary (LC2) and Site plans, designs and specifications (LC16).
Subject(s) of inspection
- LC2 - Marking of the site boundary - Rating: Green
- LC16 - Site plans, designs and specifications - Rating: Green
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
The ONR site safety and security inspectors conducted a joint inspection of Licence Condition (LC) 2 and LC16. The inspection was conducted over two days and included reviewing the extant EDF corporate and site specific compliance documentation for both LC's and gathering evidence that these procedures were being adhered to as well as walking down the perimeter fence and licensed site boundary.
Some minor regulatory advice was given to the site team during the feedback session. In addition, two level 4 regulatory issues will be raised. The first of these issues relates to a potential encroachment of the licenced site boundary (but outside the outer site fence) by the neighbouring company (ABLE UK). EDF are required to ensure that the entire site boundary is clearly demarcated, which was evidenced during our site walkdown and which was inspected against the extant site plan and schedule. However, there is a small area to the west of the Hartlepool site where the licenced site extends beyond the site perimeter fence. This area is predominantly shrubland up to the point it meets the ABLE UK land. There are several licenced site signs in this area where ABLE UK have attached barriers to, and potentially encroached on the EDF side of the boundary. I considered this to be a minor non-compliance as the entire perimeter fence is otherwise in good condition and there is no immediate risk to the site but I have expressed concern that EDF must engage with ABLE UK to ensure this issue is rectified.
The second regulatory issue relates to a gap in knowledge around the primary implementation document (PID) for LC2. The site head of security and assistant site head of security were not aware of this document which forms part of EDF's compliance arrangements for LC2. I consider this a minor issue as I am content, with the agreement of the ONR site security inspector, that it was likely that all aspects of the document are already being complied with, through compliance with other documentation. Some of the requirements from the PID are focused on EDF fleet oversight and so not all aspects are the responsibility of the site. I have asked for confirmation from site, with approval from site INA, that they review this document and provide written confirmation to ONR that they have implemented all aspects of the PID and that it forms part of the SHoS handover when he retires next year.
Conclusion
Based on our observations and the evidence presented to us an inspection rating of 'GREEN' was awarded for both LC2 and LC16.